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SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF JOURNALISTIC MATERIAL:
THE SING TAO DAILY CASE
U
Andrew S. Y. Li' and Ann Lui"
The constitutional guarantee of a free press has been almost taken for granted by all
in Hong Kong. In safeguarding press freedom, the protection of journalistic sources
is of particular importance to ensure that the press can properly perform its role as
society's watchdog. However, in So Wing Keung v Sing Tao Limited and Hsu Hiu
Yee, the Hong Kong Court of Appeal has taken quite a different view on the matter.
This could have a long-term impact on the development of press freedom and the use
of journalistic material in Hong Kong. This article seeks to look at the subtle, but
significant change in the landscape on press freedom resulting from the Court's
decision.
Introduction
"In short, in Hong Kong a free press is a constitutional guarantee. It is a
guarantee of the greatest importance for it is the function of the press to
act as the eyes and ears of all concerned citizens. It was Thomas Jefferson,
the third president of the United States of America, who said, 'No gov-
ernment ought to be without censors, and where the press is free none
ever will"': per Hartmann J in the Court of First Instance in So Wing Keung
v Sing Tao Ltd and Hsu Hiu Yee (hereinafter "Sing Tao Daily").'
On 24 July 2004, the Independent Commission Against Corruption
(ICAC) executed 14 search warrants against seven newspapers and the of-
fices or homes of several journalists. These search and seizure operations created
a storm of controversy, and many were of the view that such operations
constituted an infringement of press freedom in Hong Kong.2 One of the
newspapers concerned, Sing Tao Daily, decided to challenge the validity of
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unrep., Miscellaneous Proceedings No 1833 of 2004 (Court of First Instance, 10 Aug 2004), para 47.
2 Hong Kong Journalist Association (HKJA), Law on Search and Seizure Needs Urgent Overhaul, sub-
mitted to Legislative Council (LegCo) Panel on Security for discussion on 2 Nov 2004, LC Paper
No CB(2)111/04-05(06), p 1. The newspapers concerned were Sing Tao Daily, Apple Daily, Oriental
Daily News, The Sun, South China Morning Post, Hong Kong Economic Journal and Ta Kung Pao.
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these search warrants.' In the Court of First Instance (CFl), Hartmann J ruled
in favour of Sing Tao Daily. He placed much emphasis on the need to protect
the confidentiality of journalistic sources and the importance of safeguarding
freedom of the press, so as to enable the press to effectively carry out its func-
tion as "watchdogs" in society.' The ICAC appealed against the decision. In
the Court of Appeal (CA), Ma CJHC affirmed the decision of the CFI, but
only on a technical ground. In a lengthy obiter, however, Ma CJHC opined
that he would have upheld the validity of the search warrants were he re-
quired to rule on the merits of the case.'
It has been commented by at least one scholar who is familiar with this
jurisdiction that in litigation involving substantive human rights issues in
Hong Kong, very often cases from other jurisdictions are invoked to support
the views of the court. Sometimes, however, they are dismissed as being irrel-
evant when they do not support the court's propositions.' This was the situation
prior to the handover of sovereignty in 1997. However, it seems that the
same attitude prevails even after 1997. While this is perhaps understandable
given the fact that we are still in the infancy of the "One Country Two
Systems", it is only beneficial to the development of our own jurisprudence in
public law cases to have a consistent and rational application of cases from
other jurisdictions. The objective of this article is to compare the judgments
delivered by Hartmann J in the CFI and Ma CJHC in the CA in Sing Tao
Daily - in particular their different approaches and how they have both made
use of authorities from other jurisdictions to support their decisions. It is in-
teresting to note that both judges claimed that they were engaged in the same
balancing exercise, namely weighing the interests of the Government in its
power of investigation of crimes against the interests of the press in gathering
news and in disseminating information to the public. While Hartmann J
adopted a "constitutional approach" in that he was willing to recognize the
primacy of the constitutional guarantee of press freedom, Ma CJHC adopted
a "common law approach" in that he restricted his interpretation of the rel-
evant legislation by considering mainly, if not solely, the text of the statutory
provisions and case law.
The first part of this article will set the stage for the discussion which
consists of: (a) the background to Sing Tao Daily; (b) the legislative framework
See n 1 above, aff'd, unrep., Civil Appeal No 245 of 2004 (Court of Appeal, 11 Oct 2004). The
Applicant, So Wing Keung, is an investigator of the ICAC while the second Defendant, Hsu Hiu
Yee, is a journalist employed by Sing Tao Daily whose home was searched by the ICAC.
4 See n 1 above.
5 Ibid., unrep., Civil Appeal No 245 of 2004 (Court of Appeal, 11 Oct 2004).
6 Yash Ghai, "Sentinels of Liberty or Sheep in Woolf's Clothing? Judicial Politics and the Hong
Kong Bill of Rights," (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 459, 479. Ghai comes to this conclusion by an
analysis of case law in Hong Kong prior to its sovereignty retrocession to the People's Republic of
China in 1997.
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for the search and seizure of journalistic material in Hong Kong and other
jurisdictions; and (c) the rationale behind protecting the confidentiality of
journalistic sources. The second part of this article compares the judgments
given by Hartmann J and Ma CJHC, in particular their application of case law
from courts in the UK, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the
Supreme Court of Canada.
Search and Seizure of Journalistic Material
Background to Sing Tao Daily
On 9 July 2004, a number of persons were arrested by the ICAC for alleged
offences of corruption. Subsequently, one of the arrested persons ("the
Participant") agreed to assist the ICAC in their investigations and was placed
in a witness protection programme,7 pursuant to the Witness Protection Or-
dinance (WPO)." Section 3 of the WPO provides that such witness protection
programmes are intended to provide "protection and other assistance for wit-
nesses whose personal safety or well-being may be at risk as a result of being
witnesses". The WPO even encompasses the possibility that a witness in such
a programme may have to be provided with a new identity.' It is said to be
"paramount" that the identity of a person in such a programme is not allowed
to pass into the public domain."o Hence, heavy penalties exist against any
person who, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, discloses
information: (a) about the identity or location of a person who is or has been
a participant or who has been considered for inclusion in the witness protec-
tion programme; or (b) that compromises the security of such a person."
On 13 July 2004, several lawyers, acting under the instructions of persons
purporting to have communicated with the Participant, alleged that they had
reason to believe that the Participant was being detained by the ICAC against
her will. The lawyers sought access to the Participant, but the ICAC refused
to grant such access. The following day, an application for a writ of habeas
corpus was filed in the CFI seeking the release of the Participant from the
alleged unlawful detention.12
7 See n 1 above, paras 8 and 11.
8 Cap 564, Laws of Hong Kong.
9 Section 8(2) of the WPO.
10 See n 1 above, para 10.
" Section 17(1) of the WPO. Under s 17(4), a person who contravenes this section is liable on
conviction on indictment to a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years.
12 Ibid., para 12.
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The proceedings for the habeas corpus application were heard on 15 and
16 July 2004, either in chambers or in camera. Hartmann J dismissed the
application, being satisfied that the Participant was not in any form of custody,
nor was she being in any way held against her will." As the hearings were all
heard behind closed doors, it is somewhat surprising that the events spanning
the evening of 13 July 2004 through to the dismissal of the habeas corpus
application were reported by seven local newspapers, disclosing details in re-
lation to the Participant's identity. 4
Against this background, the ICAC made an ex parte application before
Stone J seeking the issue of 14 search warrants to enable their officers to enter
the premises of the seven newspapers concerned and the offices or homes of a
number of journalists.
The ICAC was concerned that two offences might be involved: (a) dis-
closure of the identity of the Participant, in contravention of section 17(1) of
the WPO; and (b) conspiracy to pervert the course of public justice, as cer-
tain persons might have pursued the habeas corpus application not for the
bona fide purpose of seeking the release of the Participant, but for intimidat-
ing her and thereby dissuading her from acting as a prosecution witness. The
ICAC justified their application by explaining that the search and seizure
operations would enable them to discover the source that had leaked the
confidential information and would be of assistance in the furtherance of
their investigation.
Stone J granted the search warrants pursuant to section 85 of the Interpreta-
tion and General Clauses Ordinance (IGCO), 5 ordering that all material seized
under the warrants be sealed so that the owners of the material could have
a period of three days to apply to the Court for the return of the material.'"
The legislative framework that provides for the search and seizure of journal-
istic material will be examined more closely in the following section.
The Legislative Framework
Search and seizure of journalistic material in Hong Kong
Part XII of the IGCO, which contains provisions regarding the search and
seizure of journalistic material, was enacted in 1995 with a view to providing
13 See In re W (Application for a writ of habeas corpus), unrep., Constitutional and Administrative Law
List No 89 of 2004 (Court of First Instance, 16 July 2004), included in LC Paper No CB(2)192/04-
05(01).
14 See n 1 above, para 13.
15 Cap 1, Laws of Hong Kong.
16 See n 1 above, paras 2-4.
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additional safeguards for such material." During the second reading of the
Interpretation and General Clauses (Amendment) Bill 1995 in the Legisla-
tive Council (LegCo) for the enactment of Part XII, one LegCo member
remarked that "this Bill is of great significance in that it is the first time in our
legislative history that journalistic material is given protection against unfair
or unnecessary search and seizure by law enforcement agencies". It was be-
lieved "that [these] proposals strike the balance between the need to protect
press freedom and the need of our law enforcement agencies in their perfor-
mance of duties."'"
"Journalistic material" is defined in section 82(1) of the IGCO to mean,
subject to subsection (2), "any material acquired or created for the purposes
of journalism". Section 82(2) provides that "[miaterial is only journalistic
material for the purposes of this Part if it is in the possession of a person who
acquired it or created it for the purposes of journalism". Section 82(3) further
provides that "[a] person who receives material from someone who intends
that the recipient should use it for the purposes of journalism is to be taken to
have acquired it for those purposes.""
The statutory scheme laid down in Part XII of the IGCO provides for a
three-tier approach on the access to journalistic material by law enforcement
agencies:
(i) First tier. An inter partes application for a production order may be
made, requiring the person who possesses the journalistic material
to produce it or to give the officer access to it. The conditions that
must be satisfied before such an order will be granted include, among
others, that the material is likely to be of substantial value to the
17 LegCo, Official Record of Proceedings, 28 July 1995, pp 6453-6472. Previously, search and seizure of
journalistic material was regulated under s 50(7) of the Police Force Ordinance (PFO, Cap 232).
This provision empowered the police, upon the issue of a warrant by a magistrate, to enter any
place and take possession of any newspaper, book or document that is reasonably required if the
police has reasonable cause to suspect there is material of value to the investigation of any offence.
In Oct 1989, police officers, in exercise of the powers conferred under the PFO, entered and searched
the offices of two local television stations, seizing a number of videotapes that contained footages of
a clash between the police and pro-democracy demonstrators. Much controversy was raised over
this incident. In the end, the LegCo decided to amend the IGCO rather than the PFO to reform
the legislative framework for the search and seizure of journalistic material by law enforcement
agencies. See also LegCo Panel on Security, The Interpretation and General Clauses (Amendment) Bill
1995: Protection of Journalistic Material, a paper submitted for discussion at a LegCo Panel on Secu-
rity special meeting on 29 Nov 2004, LC Paper No CB(2)111/04-05(04).
18 See the speech of the Honourable Andrew Wong, Official Record of Proceedings (n 17 above), p 6456.
19 It should be noted that "it was a conscious decision on the part of the Administration not to define
the expression [journalistic material] in specific terms because it may have the undesirable effect of
reducing the scope of protection for journalistic material. Similarly, 'journalism' should be con-
strued according to its ordinary and natural meaning; the scope of protection might be reduced by
defining it." See the speech of the Honourable Andrew Wong, Official Record of Proceedings (n 17
above), p 6 455.
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investigation of an arrestable offence;20 and that it is in the public
interest to grant the order, having regard to both the likely benefit
to the investigation and the circumstances under which the jour-
nalistic material is held.21
(ii) Second tier. An ex parte application for a warrant may be made to
enter premises and to search for or seize journalistic material. The
judge must be satisfied that: the production order is not complied
with; or in addition to fulfilling the requirements under the first tier,
it is not practicable to apply for a production order, or the service of a
notice to the other party for an inter partes hearing may seriously preju-
dice the investigation (because the other party may destroy the
material in their possession). Such an ex parte application should not
be made unless approved personally by a directorate disciplined officer.
Any material seized must be sealed pending the outcome of an appli-
cation for the return of the material through an inter partes hearing.22
(iii) Third tier. In exceptional circumstances, an ex parte application for a
warrant may be made for a warrant and for the immediate use of the
journalistic material seized, without having to seal the material. In
addition to having to fulfill the requirements under the second tier,
the judge must be satisfied that there may be serious prejudice to the
investigation if the applicant is not permitted to have immediate
access to the material.23
In Sing Tao Daily, Stone J, after a "robust and lengthy" hearing, granted
the warrants to the ICAC under the second tier.24
Search and seizure of journalistic material in other jurisdictions
In Sing Tao Daily, apart from local case law, Hartmann J in the CFI relied on
decisions from the UK courts and the ECHR, while Ma CJHC in the CA on
decisions from the UK and Canada. Thus, an understanding of the legal frame-
work on the search and seizure of journalistic material in those jurisdictions
will facilitate the analysis of the application of these foreign cases by the two
judges. While a detailed analysis of the law on search and seizure in these
different jurisdictions is beyond the scope of this article, an outline of the
20 "Arrestable offence" is defined in s 3 of the IGCO to mean "an offence for which the sentence is
fixed by law or for which a person may under or by virtue of any law be sentenced to imprisonment
for a term exceeding 12 months, and an attempt to commit any such offence"
21 Section 84 of the IGCO.
22 lbid., s 85.
23 Ibid.
24 See n 1 above, para 3, per Hartmann J.
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relevant law in this area in the UK, several European countries and Canada
may be helpful.
The UK. In the UK, the scheme in force in relation to the search and
seizure of journalistic material, provided for in the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act 1984 (PACE)," is quite similar to the one in force in Hong
Kong. 6 Section 9 of the PACE excludes the application of any pre-existing
Act authorizing the issue of search warrant insofar as it relates to the authori-
zation of searches of "excluded material" or "special procedural material".
Journalistic material held in confidence falls within the former, whereas jour-
nalistic material not so held is covered by the latter. These two kinds of material
are to be accessible to investigators only in the limited circumstances and
subject to the special procedures laid down under Schedule 1 of the PACE."
A two-tier approach on the access to journalistic material by law enforce-
ment agencies is adopted in the PACE. The first tier provides that a constable
may apply to a circuit judge in an inter partes hearing for a production order,
while the second tier provides that a constable may make an ex parte applica-
tion to a circuit judge for a warrant authorizing him to enter premises and to
search for journalistic materials.28 The main difference between the two-tier
approach adopted in the UK and the three-tier approach adopted in Hong
Kong is that in the UK under the PACE, there is no requirement that the
journalistic material seized pursuant to the warrant has to be sealed, nor is
there any specific provision for an inter partes application for the return of the
material.
Countries in the European Union.29 In France, Article 56.2 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure provides that in relation to search and seizure in media
premises, the investigating judge or State prosecutor must be present to en-
sure that the investigations "do not encroach on the free exercise of the
journalist's profession". While not all European countries have legislation
directly in relation to the search and seizure of journalistic material, many of
them have legislated a press law to protect journalists from being coerced
25 C 60, Laws of England.
26 Part XII of the IGCO was, to a certain extent, modeled upon the relevant UK provisions. For
example, the definition of "journalistic material" was taken from the PACE. See Official Record of
Proceedings (n 17 above).
27 LegCo Panel on Security, Comparative Study on the Power of Search and Seizure oflournalistic Material,
LC Paper No CB(2)111/04-05(05), pp 6-7.
28 For a more detailed account of the procedure under s 9 of the PACE, see Richard Stone, Entry,
Search and Seizure: a Guide to Civil and Criminal Powers of Entry (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd
edn, 1997), pp 83-90.
29 For a comprehensive analysis of Strasbourg jurisprudence in relation to protection of journalistic
sources, see Dirk Voorhoof, "The Protection of Journalistic Sources Under Fire?" presented at the
European Federation of Journalists' conference on protection of journalistic sources, Prague,
23 May 2003, available at http://www.ifj-europe.org/default.asp?Issue=EFJsources&Language=EN.
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into disclosing their confidential sources of information. In France, Article
109(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that "any journalist who
appears as a witness concerning information gathered by him in the course of
his journalistic activity is free not to disclose its source". There are provisions
to the same effect in Austria," Germany,3 1 Sweden,32 and Luxembourg.33
Belgium has recently drafted legislation for the protection of journalistic
sources. 34
Canada. In Canada, there is no specific legislation on the search and sei-
zure of journalistic material. 35 The power to issue a warrant for entry and
search of premises generally in the course of criminal investigation is set out
in section 487 of the Criminal Code.36 Journalistic premises and material are
subject to such general search and seizure powers conferred on law enforce-
ment agencies.37 However, the application of the general search power under
section 487 of the Criminal Code to journalistic material has been consid-
ered judicially.
Rationale Behind Protecting Confidentiality of Journalistic Sources
In Hong Kong, freedom of the expression is protected under Article 19 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In addition,
press freedom is explicitly protected under Article 27 of the Basic Law, Hong
Kong's "mini constitution". However, it would be futile to merely empower
journalists with such rights in the abstract, if they are barred from exercising
the same in a concrete way. Furthermore, it is well known that such rights are
not absolute; under the ICCPR the restrictions which may be imposed upon
30 Art 31 of the Media Act 1981.
31 Section 383 of the Civil Procedure Code; s 53 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
32 Ch 3, Art 1 of the Freedom of the Press Act.
3 Ch IV, Art 7 and 8 of Law of 8 June 2004 on the freedom of expression in the media ("Loi du 8 juin
sur la liberte d'expression dans les medias").
3 Draft law on the protection of journalists' sources adopted by the Chamber of Representatives of
Belgium on 6 May 2004 and sent for review in the Senate (Doc 51 0024/017), available at http://
www.lachambre.be.
3 For a more detailed account of the law in relation to search of media premises in Canada, see
James Fontana, The Law of Search and Seizure in Canada (Canada: Butterworths, 5 th edn, 2002),
pp 258-262.
6 RSC 1985, c C-46. The provision empowers a justice of peace to issue a search warrant if he is
satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is in the
premises: (a) anything on or in respect of which any offence against the Criminal Code or any
other Act of Parliament has been or is suspected to have been committed; or (b) certain offence-
related material as specified in s 487(1).
3 In comparison, under the schemes implemented in Hong Kong and in the UK, journalistic material
is excluded from the application of general search and seizure powers conferred on law enforcement
agencies.
38 See the Supreme Court of Canada's companion decisions in Canadian Broadcasting Corp v Lessard
67 CCC (3d) 517 (1991) and Canadian Broadcasting Corp v AG for New Brunswick et al 67 CCC
(3rd) 544 (1991). The latter was referred to by Ma CJHC in So Wing Keung (n 5 above), para 43(4).
3 As incorporated into the laws of Hong Kong through Art 39 of the Basic Law.
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the exercise of the right are limited by Article 19(3). Thus, the duty to bal-
ance competing interests, as well as the power to concretely instill in the
press the rights guaranteed by our constitutional documents, rest largely with
the judiciary.
The core problem that "plagues" the legitimisation of press freedom in
Hong Kong turns out to be the judiciary's inability to formulate and recognize
the philosophical justification underlying the protection of press freedom.40
Before analyzing the decisions in Sing Tao Daily, at the outset we should dis-
cern the rationale behind protecting journalists' confidential sources and the
relationship between this and press freedom.
In relation to the protection of journalistic sources on the basis of Article
10 of the European Convention on Human Rights,4 ' the ECHR in Goodwin v
United Kingdom (hereinafter "Goodwin") authoritatively stated the rationale
behind the protection of journalistic sources:
"Protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press
freedom, as is reflected in the laws and professional codes of conduct in a
number of Contracting States and is affirmed in several international
instruments on journalistic freedoms. Without such protection, sources
may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the public on
matters of public interest. As a result the vital public watchdog role of the
press may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate
and reliable information may be adversely affected. Having regard to the
importance of the protection of journalistic sources for press freedom in a
democratic society and the potentially chilling effect an order of source
disclosure has on the exercise of that freedom, such a measure cannot be
compatible with Article 10 of the Convention unless it is justified by an
overriding requirement in the public interest."
Enough emphasis cannot be placed on the "vital public watchdog role"
played by the press. Stewart J of the US Supreme Court stated this in another
way by explaining that "[tihe primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee
of a free press was to create a fourth institution outside the Government as an
additional check on the three official branches"." Given the fact that Hong
Kong is supposed to be a predominantly executive-led society, where public
officials are not directly accountable to the legislature, and that Hong Kong
40 Anne S.Y. Cheung, "One Step Forward Two Steps Back: A Study of Press Law in Post-Colonial
Hong Kong", (2002) 3(4) Journalism and Communication Monographs 189, 193.
41 The freedom of expression clause.
42 Goodwin v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 123, para 39 (hereinafter "Goodwin").
43 Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press", (Jan 1975) 26 Hastings Law journal 631, 634.
Vol 35 Part 1
HeinOnline -- 35 Hong Kong L.J. 77 2005
is not yet a full democracy, the press has an especially important role to play
as the "fourth estate" or the "watchdog" over the government.
In the light of such justification for the protection of journalistic sources,
we will now turn to analyze the judgments of Hartmann J and Ma CJHC in
Sing Tao Daily.
Analysis of the CFI and CA Judgments
Court of First Instance
Jurisdiction
The first issue that Hartmann J dealt with was one of jurisdiction. He held
that he did have the necessary jurisdiction under Order 32, rule 6 of the Rules
of the High Court to hear and determine the summons to set aside the search
warrants granted by Stone J. He explained that the decision of Stone J to
issue the warrants was an "order" in civil proceedings to which Order 32, rule
6 applied."
Justification for the issue of search warrants
Moving on to the substantive issue of whether the requirements under sec-
tion 85 of the IOCO had been met in this case, Hartmann J reached the
conclusion that on the material before him, the ICAC had not made out a
sufficient case for search warrants to be issued. After considering a series of
English authorities, he set out seven principles in relation to applications
made under section 85 of the IGCO:5
1. An application for a search warrant constitutes a serious intrusion upon
the freedom of the press. The responsibility for ensuring that the pro-
cedure is not abused lies with the courts and it is of cardinal importance
that judges should be scrupulous in discharging that responsibility.
2. The fact that an officer, who has been investigating the matter, states
in his affidavit that he considers that there are reasonable grounds for
the search warrants to be issued is not enough; the judge himself must
be satisfied.
3. An application for a search warrant should not be a matter of common
form - the preferred method should be by way of giving notice to seek
a production order.
4 See n 1 above, paras 30-44.
l bid., para 65.
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4. The fact that the staff of a newspaper or journalists believed to be in
possession of journalistic material may themselves be under investiga-
tion for the commission of criminal offences is not of itself necessarily
a sufficient reason for a judge issuing a warrant.
5. A judge should not issue a warrant unless material is placed before him
demonstrating that in the particular case, if notice is given, there is a
real risk, as opposed to a mere possibility, that the journalistic material
will be hidden or destroyed.
6. In determining an application made under section 85 of the IGCO, a
judge should give reasons for his decision even though they need not
be elaborate.
7. An applicant who seeks the issue of a warrant under section 85 of the
IGCO must act in the utmost good faith and give full and frank disclo-
sure in making the ex parte application.
Hartmann J was of the opinion that Stone J made the orders without the
benefit of the jurisprudence and guidance he had. He believed that had the
judge's attention been drawn to the legal authorities containing these seven
principles, it was highly unlikely that the warrants would have been granted."
On the facts of the case, Hartmann J was not convinced by the ICAC that
there was a real risk of Sing Tao Daily destroying the journalistic material
sought in the investigation. Moreover, the ICAC did not seek voluntary
disclosure, nor did it seek the delivery of the material under the first tier - the
"6production order route". By making an ex parte application for search warrants,
it went directly to measure of the last resort." He ruled that the ICAC was
wrong in fact and in law in seeking the issue of search warrants when, in
terms of the statutory scheme contained within Part XII of the IGCO, it
could equally have achieved its legitimate aim by less intrusive measures.
Accordingly, the search warrants were set aside in terms of Order 32, rule 6.
Article 27 of the Basic Law
In interpreting the relevant statutory provisions in this case, Hartmann J
remarked that Part XII of the IGCO "must be viewed through the prism of
Art 27 of the Basic Law"."o The constitutional guarantee for a free press is "of
the greatest importance for it is the function of the press to act as the eyes and
ears of all concerned citi:ens".5 ' Furthermore, he emphasi:ed:
40 [bid., para 70.
47 Ibid., para 67.
4 Ibid., para63.
40 Ibid., para 71.
5o Ibid., para 46.
5 Ibid., para 47.
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"a free press must be an effective press, not moribund or compliant ... it
must be able, when necessary, to obtain information which would other-
wise not be revealed to the light of the day and to protect the identity of
those willing to pass on such information."12
Court of Appeal
When the ICAC appealed to the CA, there were four issues identified in the
appeal: (1) whether the CA had the jurisdiction to hear the appeal; (2) whether
the appeal was academic; (3) whether Hartmann J had jurisdiction to set
aside the warrants under Order 32, rule 6 or the Court's inherent jurisdiction;
and (4) the merits of the case - whether there was justification to issue the
search warrants in the present case. As previously noted, the judgment was
given by Ma CJHC, with Stuart-Moore V-P and Stock JA in concurrence.
Issue 1: Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal
In relation to the first issue, although this appeal was marked as a civil appeal,
Ma CJHC ruled that the proceedings underlying Hartmann J's decision
were not a civil cause or matter. As such, the CA had no jurisdiction to hear
the appeal and the appeal of the ICAC must inevitably be dismissed."
The only means of appeal would be an appeal to the Court of Final Appeal
(CFA), pursuant to section 31(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final
Appeal Ordinance.
However, despite having decided that the CA had no jurisdiction to hear
this appeal, Ma CJHC continued. Citing the Privy Council's decision of George
Tan Soon-gin v His Honour Judge Cameron and Another," he said he was aware
that "any observations concerning the merits of an appeal which should not
be before the court must necessarily be extra-judicial". Nevertheless, he was
of the view that since: (1) his conclusions on jurisdiction could be wrong;
and (2) the other issues identified had been fully argued, he should state his
views on these issues as well out of completeness.5 Accordingly, as obiter,
Ma CJHC gave his views on the three remaining issues.
Issue 2: Whether the appeal was purely academic
In relation to the second issue, counsel for the Respondents in the appeal
submitted that as all the material that were seized during the searches made
by the ICAC under the search warrants had then been made available to
52 Ibid., para 48.
5 Ibid., paras 28-33.
54 Cap 484, Laws of Hong Kong.
1 [1992] 2 AC 205, p 221 E-F.
56 See n 5 above, para 33.
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them, there was nothing to be gained whichever way this appeal was decided."
Ma CJHC, however, was of the view that this case was not purely academic
and should be heard. He explained that apart from having to resolve the issue
of costs, this appeal was of considerable public interest as it involved the
examination of provisions that affected one of the basic freedoms enshrined
in the Basic Law. Furthermore, a number of other newspapers were in a simi-
lar position and were awaiting the outcome of the appeal."
Issue 3: Jurisdiction to set aside search warrants
In relation to the third issue, Ma CJHC decided that the only means for an
affected party to challenge a section 85 decision is by way of an application
for an order to return the seized journalistic material pursuant to section 87 of
the IGCO. Accordingly, Hartmann J was wrong to assume jurisdiction under
Order 32, rule 6 to set aside the ex parte Order. According to Ma CJHC, he
should instead have determined the issue in the light of section 87 of the
IGCO, which he failed to do.'
Issue 4: Justification for the issue of search warrants
Finally, in relation to the fourth issue, Ma CJHC made it clear that had the
CA possessed the necessary jurisdiction, the appeal would have been decided
in favour of the ICAC on the merits.
In an analysis of whether the search warrants should have been issued in
the first place, Ma CJHC dealt briefly with the seven principles put forward
by Hartmann J in the CFI. He was of the opinion that the seven principles
were obvious ones, having regard to the express provisions of Part XII of the
IGCO or as a matter of good judicial practice. He had "no doubt" that Stone
J already had most of these principles in mind when granting the search
warrants. He failed to see how these principles could have affected the deci-
sion of Stone J one way or the other, had the judge been provided with the
relevant authorities containing these principles.o There are two points made
by Ma CJHC that should be highlighted: (1) Part XII of the IGCO does not
require an application for a production order to be made before a search
warrant can be sought from the court, nor does the legislation suggest that
this is the preferred procedure;" and (2) section 85(5)(c) of the IGCO only
requires it be shown that an application for a production order "may seriously
l7 Ibid., para 26.
58 Ibid., paras 34-35.
Ibid., paras 36-40.
60 Ibid., paras 44-46.
61 Ibid., with reference to Principle 3, suggested by Hartmann J.
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prejudice the investigation", not a "real risk" or "substantial probability" that
the journalistic material sought will be destructed or concealed. 2
Ma CJHC held that, on the facts of the case, the issue of the search
warrants was justified, as the service of notice of application for a produc-
tion order under section 84 of the IGCO might have seriously prejudiced
the investigations. The facts revealed a very disturbing state of affairs, as
the motive behind the leaking of information concerning the identity of
the Participant to the press might have been to undermine her willingness
to continue to assist the ICAC. There was the possibility of very serious
offences having been committed. Indeed, there was even prima facie evi-
dence that the Respondents themselves were in contravention of section
17 of the WPO.
Article 27 of the Basic Law
Most interesting is how Ma CJHC's view on Article 27 of the Basic Law
contrasts with that of Hartmann J's. Although Hartmann J boldly put for-
ward that the scheme contained in Part XII of the IGCO had to be viewed
"through the prism" of Article 27 of the Basic Law,63 Ma CJHC was of the
view that "this is apt to confuse":"
"If all that was meant was that Part XII deals with the permissible limits to
the freedom of the press, then I would have no quarrel with this as a
proposition. If, however, what was meant was that in approaching Part
XII applications, there should be a bias in favour of this basic freedom as
some sort of paramount consideration, I would disagree.""5
Ma CJHC remarked that the balancing exercise that Part XII focuses on is
"the freedom of the press seen against the need effectively to investigate and
deal with crime".66 There is "no bias or predisposition towards any particular
factor"."
In addition, he explained that if there is any paramount consideration
at all, it is the public interest which is mentioned in section 84(3)(d)68
62 Ibid., Principle 5.
63 See n 50 above.
64 See n 5 above, para 43.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Section 84 of the IGCO provides for the procedure for an application for production order in
respect of journalistic material.
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(imported by sections 85(3)(a)(i)),69 87(2),71 and 89(2),71 of the IGCO). In
particular, in determining whether it would be in the public interest for a
production order or a search warrant to be granted, the "public interest"
that the judge is to have regard to is expressly limited to the matters there
stipulated in the provision - "the benefit likely to accrue to the investiga-
tion" and "the circumstances under which a person in possession of the
material holds it". The legislation does not provide for an "open-ended public
interest condition."7
To sum up Ma CJHC's ruling, the appeal was dismissed as a result of the
CA's conclusion on its jurisdiction, not on the merits. As mentioned, Ma
CJHC's views on the substantive issues of this case were stated as obiter, as the
CA lacked jurisdiction to rule directly on the issues before it. Courts in Hong
Kong will not be legally bound by such statements, but in general the obiter of
an appellate court is still of highly persuasive value. There has been some
controversy as to whether Ma CJHC's approach in stating his views in favour
of upholding the validity of the search warrants as obiter was appropriate. As
commentators have pointed out, Ma CJHC has in effect overruled the deci-
sion of Hartmann J at first instance, and has given the green light for law
enforcement agencies to apply for search warrants in similar circumstances in
the future. Unfortunately, the opportunity for Sing Tao Daily to appeal to the
CFA was also curbed as they were, prima facie, the "winner" of the case."
The judgments of Hartmann J and Ma CJHC could be said to be in juxta-
position to one another. However, what is more important than the final
outcome of this case is the process by which the outcome was arrived at.
While we have no doubt that both levels of the court were able to appreciate
the crucial role of a free press in society, it is the way the CA reached its
conclusion which has caused the concern of many.
Judicial "Cherry Picking"?
It is now commonplace in many jurisdictions for judges to refer to the deci-
sions of the courts of foreign jurisdictions when interpreting domestic human
rights guarantees. There is usually a list of factors that a judge will consider
Section 85 of the IGCO provides for the procedure for an application for warrant to sei:e journal-
istic material.
70 Section 87 of the IGCO provides for the procedure in relation to sealed material.
7 Section 89(2) of IGCO provides that: "For the avoidance of doubt, it is declared that nothing in
this Part [Part X1l] shall be construed as requiring a judge to make an order under this Part where he
considers that, in all the circumstances of the case, it would not be in the public interest to make
that order."
7 See n 5 above, para 43.
7 See Margaret Ng and Benny Tai in "The Legal Profession Questions the Appropriateness of the
Approach Adopted by the Court of Appeal", Hong Kong EconomicJournal, 12 Oct 2004 (in Chinese,
translation of headline by authors).
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before applying foreign judicial decisions, such as the differences in constitu-
tional structure between the two jurisdictions, and the perceived judicial
competence of the foreign court in the area of law in issue. Ultimately,
however, the decision whether to use foreign judicial decisions is largely in
the realm of judicial discretion.
As a result, very often there is substantial "cherry picking" of which juris-
diction (and cases) to cite, and those jurisdictions chosen will be those which
are likely to support the conclusion sought." As Tripathi remarks:
"When a judge looks to foreign legal systems for analogies that shed light
on any of the new cases before him, he is looking to legal material which
he is absolutely free to reject unless it appeals to his reason. Appeal to
one's reason, more often than not, amount to a confirmation and a strength-
ening of one's own opinion rather than a shaping of that opinion.""
In Hong Kong, references to foreign law have become a touchstone in
debates between liberal and conservative members of the judiciary."7 In the
judgments of Hartmann J and Ma CJHC, the foreign authorities that they
cited were vastly different even if they did not contradict each other. To
explain this in the light of Tripathi's remarks, this can be attributed to the
very different preconceptions which the two judges brought to the case. Both
were trying to "cherry pick" foreign cases that confirmed and strengthened
their contrasting views on this matter. Hartmann J relied on cases which
supported his constitutional approach to the interpretation of Part XII of the
IGCO, while Ma CJHC relied on a common law approach.
The main problem with this "cherry picking" approach is that it may lead
to arbitrary instead of legitimate decision making. 7 We are in no way sug-
gesting that arbitrary decision making was demonstrated in this case. However,
as Cheung points out, a detailed analysis of the judicial decisions in relation
to press freedom in Hong Kong in the past decade shows that Hong Kong
courts have often been unable to articulate the basis for their decisions.78 As
illustrated below, the judge's choices of foreign cases relied upon can have a
strong bearing as to how the rationale behind a decision is articulated.
7 Christopher McCrudden, "A Common Law of Human Rights? Transnational Judicial Conversa-
tions on Constitutional Rights", (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 499, 507.
75 Pradyumna K. Tripathi, "Foreign Precedents and Constitutional Law", (1957) 57 Columbia Law
Review 319, 346; see also n 74 above, p 516.
76 See n 6 above.
7 See n 74 above.
78 See n 40 above, p 214.
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UK authorities
Given that the Hong Kong legal system was largely transplanted from the
UK, and the high degree of similarity between the scheme for the search and
seizure of journalistic material under the PACE and that under the IGCO, it
is not surprising that both Hartmann J and Ma CJHC cited English cases
extensively in their judgments. In fact, Hartmann J relied solely on English
cases in formulating his seven principles. However, as most of these cases are
not directly related to the search and seizure of journalistic material per se,79
our focus will primarily be on R v Central Criminal Court, ex parte Bright
(hereinafter "Bright"),80 which was cited by Ma CJHC,8 ' but not by Hartmann
J; and Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd (hereinafter "Ashworth"),"
which was cited by Hartmann J, but not by Ma CJHC. These two cases deal
with search and seizure matters.
In the UK, until more recently when the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA)
came into force in 2000, press freedom was only protected by unwritten
convention; there was no positive guarantee by constitution." The HRA pro-
vides that English courts in interpreting European Convention rights must
take the jurisprudence of the ECHR into account." This different constitu-
tional context should be borne in mind when applying English human rights
cases in Hong Kong.
Bright was decided just shortly before the enactment of the HRA. An En-
glish newspaper, The Guardian, published the text of a letter from David
Shayler, an ex-M15 employee who was at that stage living in Paris and resist-
ing extradition to the UK on charges under the Official Secrets Act 1989.
Shayler had made various allegations of misdeeds by MIS, including the
involvement in a plot to assassinate Colonel Gaddafi, the head of state of
Libya. Another newspaper, The Observer, published an article commenting
on a letter which Shayler had previously sent to the Home Secretary, again in
connection with the alleged plot. The UK Divisional Court largely set aside
the orders granted for the search and seizure of the newspapers' premises.
Ma CJHC relied on this case as proposition for the argument that the "pub-
lic interest" in section 84(3)(d)(i) is not an open-ended public interest."
In Bright, it was, indeed, held that "public interest" in the equivalent section
7 R v Southampton Crown Court, ex parte ) and P [1993] Crim LR 962; and R v Leeds Crown Court,
ex parte Switalski [19911 Crim LR 559, both cited in n I above, para 65, concern warrants to search
solicitors' premises.
8 [20011 2 All ER 244 (hereinafter "Bright").
81 See n 5 above, para 43.
82 [2001] 1 WLR 515, aff'd by the House of Lords (2002] 1 WLR 2033 (hereinafter "Ashworth").
83 Geoffrey Robertson and Andrew Nicol, Media Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), p xii.
84 Section 2 of the HRA, C 42, Laws of the United Kingdom.
85 See n 5 above, para 43.
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of the PACE was limited to the potential benefit to the investigation and the
circumstances in which the person against whom the order is sought "holds"
the material. What is more interesting is that the court in Bright demon-
strated how it showed deference to Parliamentary sovereignty, and hence
adopted the common law approach as opposed to the constitutional approach
in its interpretation of the PACE. In relation to considerations of press free-
dom and protection against self-incrimination,8 6 Lord Justice Judge remarked:
"It seems improbable that the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was foremost in the mind
of Parliament when this special procedure was enacted ... [G]enerally the
vast and increasingly lengthy number of citations in numerous skeleton
and oral arguments of the decisions of the European Court [are] simply
repeating in different language long standing and well understood prin-
ciples of the common law.""
By choosing to rely on Bright, an inference can be drawn that Ma CJHC,
influenced by the English tradition, also supports the proposition that the
common law is sufficient to protect fundamental rights and freedoms. He
hardly made any further reference to Article 27 of the Basic Law after stating
that it does not grant a presumption in favour of the press in the interpreta-
tion of the relevant provisions of the IGCO. His judgment clearly
demonstrated that he adhered to the common law rules of interpretation with
its concentration on the text of the statutory provisions, rather than resort-
ing to a broad and purposive approach of interpretation based on the Basic
Law. One commentator has referred to this attitude, shared among many
judges in Hong Kong since the pre-1997 colonial era, as the "common law
superiority syndrome"."
In contrast, the judicial attitude in the English Court of Appeal's decision
in Ashworth was vastly different from that in Bright. The decision in Ashworth
was subsequently affirmed by the House of Lords, although it was the Court of
Appeal's judgment which Hartmann J relied on to point out that the "chill-
ing effect" of court orders requiring source disclosure is not affected by the
importance of the information or the mercenary motives of the source. 89
86 Judge LJ decided that these were valid factors to take into account when the judge is exercising his
discretion to determine whether the warrants should indeed be granted, once the prerequisites
have been satisfied.
87 See Bright (n 80 above), p 261.
88 Johannes M. M. Chan, "Hong Kong's Bill of Rights: Its Reception of and Contribution to Interna-
tional and Comparative Jurisprudence", (1998) 47 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
306, 312.
89 See Ashworth (n 82 above), p 537.
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In Ashworth, the statutory provision under consideration was not the PACE,
but section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 ("the 1981 Act")," which
provides:
"No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of
contempt of court for refusing to disclose, the source of information con-
tained in a publication for which he is responsible, unless it be established
to the satisfaction of the court that disclosure is necessary in the interests
of justice or national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime."
The case involved the corrupt behaviour of an employee of a mental
hospital, who in breach of the Prevention of Corruption Acts as well as in
breach of contract, was supplying confidential documents about inmates to
the tabloids. In the need to protect the privacy of the inmates, and to detect
and punish serious criminal conduct, the court made an order to unmask the
source. In coming to this conclusion, the court interpreted section 10 of the
1981 Act in the light of Article 10 of the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights." Laws LJ also emphasized the court's duty under
the HRA to take Strasbourg jurisprudence into account. This reflects the
approach adopted by Hartmann J as well in his audacious attempt to grant
greater protection to the press by basing the rationale of his judgment explic-
itly on Article 27 of the Basic Law.
After the implementation of the HRA, the trend in the UK is for the courts
to give force to constitutional protection for the freedom of expression.92
We would argue that it is high time for the judiciary in Hong Kong to be more
consistent in applying cases which recognize constitutional guarantees of fun-
damental human rights. Hong Kong courts should be strong to maintain
international standards of human rights protection.
ECHR authorities
There is a perception that different jurisdictions take differing ideological
positions on human rights issues, and choosing to emulate a particular coun-
try or region's approach to human rights may be regarded as a sign of a particular
orientation towards human rights."
The importance of the protection of journalistic sources is explicitly
recognized in many European jurisdictions. Apart from the fact that many
9 C 49, Laws of England.
91 The freedom of expression clause.
92 See n 83 above, pp 65-70.
9 See n 74 above, pp 500-501.
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countries in the European Union have legislated to protect confidential
sources, 94 the Council of Europe has also adopted Recommendation (2000) 7
"on the right of journalists not to disclose their source of information". 9 In
the English Court of Appeal decision of Ashworth, Lord Philips accepted a
submission from counsel that "the decisions of the European Court demon-
strate that the freedom of the press has in the past carried greater weight in
Strasbourg than it has in the courts of this country".9' Thus, it would appear
natural for a court to look to ECHR authorities if it is committed to protect-
ing journalistic sources and upholding press freedom.
Hartmann J cited the landmark case of Goodwin in explaining the impor-
tance behind the protection of confidential sources.97 Interestingly, Ma CJHC
made no mentioning of Goodwin, nor did he cite any ECHR cases. As such,
he did not attempt to venture further to explain the justification for the
protection of journalistic sources, or to elaborate upon the crucial role which
the press has to play as the fourth estate in society.
We would venture to submit that the judiciary in Hong Kong should
seriously take ECHR cases into account if it is to develop any coherent
analytical structure in dealing with cases where press freedom is at stake.98
Canadian authorities
While Hartmann J did not cite any Canadian authorities in his judgment,
Ma CJHC referred to Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v Attorney General
for New Brunswick,99 where the Supreme Court of Canada was of the view
that "the constitutional protection of freedom of expression afforded by sec-
tion 2(b) of the Charter does not ... import any new or additional requirements
for the issuance of search warrants. What it does is provide a backdrop against
which the reasonableness of the search may be evaluated." 00
At first glance, it is understandable why Ma CJHC chose to "cherry pick"
this case to support his proposition that even in light of Article 27 of the
Basic Law, there is no presumption in favour of the press in the interpretation
of the relevant provisions in the IGCO. However, in comparison to Canada
4 See discussion above.
9 Committee of Ministers, Recommendation (2000) 7 on the right of journalists not to disclose their
sources of information, 8 Mar 2000, DH-MM (2000) 2, pp 125-128 (Explanatory Memorandum).
96 See Ashworth (n 82 above), pp 536-537.
9 See Goodwin (n 42 above).
98 It should be noted that no reference was made in Sing Tao Daily to the ECHR decision of Roemen
and Schmit v Luxemborg, Appl. No 51772/99, ECHR (12 Mar 2002), where the Court clearly
expressed the opinion that the searches carried out in the journalist's home and place of work was
an even greater threat to freedom of expression than a production order for the journalist to reveal
his sources.
9 (1991) 67 CCC (3rd edn), p 544.
100 Ibid., pp 556-557, cited in n 5 above, para 43.
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where there is no specific provision for the search and seizure of journalistic
material, we would argue that the legislative intent of the enactment of Part
XII of the IGCO was clearly to grant greater protection to the press,'' and
Part XII of the IGCO ought to be interpreted together with Article 27 of the
Basic Law to give effect to this."o0
Conclusion
"The guarantee of freedom of the press in law is not self-defining. Its content
depends on how much life the judiciary is willing to breathe into it."' 03 In
another case in relation to the issue of warrants for the search and seizure of
journalistic material, Apple Daily v Commissioner of Independent Commission
Against Corruption,' arguments based on Article 27 of the Basic Law were
not even raised by the defence counsel. As a result, the CFA shied away from
giving full consideration to the function of the press in society. Sing Tao Daily
provided a valuable opportunity for the CA to reconsider this issue and give
validation to Article 27 of the Basic Law. Lamentably, despite the attempt by
the CFI to boldly defend our constitutional free press clause, the CA paid
nothing more than lip service to the same. One cannot help but wonder
whether the same result would be seen had this case been given the chance to
be heard before the CFA. However, this will have to wait for another occasion.
It is not denied that the government has a legitimate interest in its inves-
tigation of crimes. However, in balancing this public interest against another
public interest, namely, the press' function in gathering information, a strong
and independent judiciary with a genuine conviction towards the protection
of a free press must look into and articulate the rationale behind the protec-
tion of press freedom. Enshrining press freedom in our constitution can at
most empower the press in the abstract; the decision of the CA, juxtaposed
against the decision of the CFI, demonstrates that press freedom is being
dispossessed in the real world.
101 See discussion above.
102 It should be noted that in a more recent decision of R v National Post 69 OR (3rd) 427, the constitu-
tional issues in relation to the search of a newspaper's premises in the light of s 2(b) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms were fully analyzed. At 427, Benotto J of the Ontario Superior Court
of Justice decided, at 427, that "ilt is because of the fundamental importance of a free press in a
democratic society that special considerations arise in applications to search media premises or to
seize material from journalists ... the effect of the search and seizure on the ability of the press to fulfill
its function must be considered by the justice of peace before granting the order."
103 See n 40 above, p 214.
104 [2000] 1 HKC 295; aff'd by Court of Final Appeal, consolidated in the same judgment.
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